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REPRESENTATIONS INVOLVING FIDUCIARY
ENTITIES: WHO IS THE CLIENT?
JEFFREY N. PENNELL *
A significant unresolved ethical issue that haunts attorneys who are
engaged to assist in the administration of a fiduciary entity is: to
whom do the attorney's duties and loyalties run, and with what ancillary
or derivative obligations? In most situations this "who is the client" is-
sue is of academic interest only, because the potential for a real conflict
among the fiduciary, beneficiaries, and claimants such as creditors or dis-
appointed heirs never ripens into a real controversy. But in a small per-
centage of cases involving fiduciary administration the real and present
issue is whether an attorney who is engaged to advise the administration
represents the fiduciary who actually hired the attorney, the beneficiaries
of the fiduciary entity, or the entity itself. This issue is complicated geo-
metrically if the attorney also is acting as fiduciary and takes the position
that the attorney also is serving in a legal advisory role.
The following hypothetical provides a framework within which to dis-
cuss ethics issues that arise if an attorney is engaged to assist in a fiduci-
ary administration. Although the same ethical issues might arise if the
facts do not posit an elderly beneficiary or fiduciary, resolution of these
issues is complicated if the elderly individual is in need of protection
from overreaching by others. Similar considerations might arise if the
facts include a minor or other legally incapacitated individual.
Hypothetical
Attorney (A) was hired to assist in the administration of an estate and
pour over trust of a decedent (D) whom A did not represent during
life. The fiduciaries are the decedent's surviving spouse (S) and two
children of the decedent's prior marriage.' A has not represented any
of these individuals previously. S is advanced in age and A is not cer-
tain whether S is having trouble dealing with the confusion and grief
that naturally would follow D's death or is in the early stages of dimin-
ished capacity. Nevertheless, S was cognizant enough as a cofiduciary
to insist on the employment of an attorney with no prior connection
with or loyalties to any of the fiduciaries or D's family.
D's estate plan provides for S for life, remainder to D's children by
the former marriage. S has a separate estate and was given no power
to divert any of D's property to S's intended beneficiaries. The chil-
dren, as remainder beneficiaries, have expressed a preference to invest
the trust for growth during S's overlife, although S is concerned about
the costs of continued long term health care and wishes to generate
* Richard H. Clark Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.
1. Appointment of such clearly adverse beneficiaries as cofiduciaries would not be
common, although it might be a testator's rudimentary effort to impose checks and bal-
ances that otherwise would not exist if either the spouse or the children were named
alone.
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maximum current income. As it is, a large portion of the corpus of the
estate is stock in a family business, in which one of the children is an
active manager, and it produces only a modest dividend and that is not
declared in every year.
Other sources of potential tension include a provision in the trust
that permits the cotrustees to invade corpus for the benefit of S but
directs them to consider S's other resources in exercising that discre-
tion. In this respect, there is some concern that, if S is beginning a
decline in both physical and mental health, it may be necessary in the
future to consider extended care or other health maintenance options,
and some attention is being focused on qualifying S for governmental
assistance and on preserving the trust assets for the ultimate remainder
beneficiaries. Whatever is done in this respect may impact the quality
of care that S receives.
During the course of administration A may be asked to advise the
cofiduciaries regarding the propriety of various fiduciary recommenda-
tions, including loans to a child or to the family business, the power to
make gifts from the corpus of the trust that will reduce the amount
includible in S's estate at death, whether to make an S Corporation
election with respect to the family business stock held in the trust, and
investment decisions that may impact the various beneficiaries. Also
possible is that a fiduciary might act improperly, perhaps even crimi-
nally, in the course of the administration and that A will learn of this
defalcation but that others will not. Assume that no guardian or per-
sonal representative has been appointed for S and none will be ap-
pointed unless A seeks that action. None of S or the children has their
own personal attorney.
Existing authority relating to the issues raised by this hypothetical is con-
fused and suggests that, at least in some contexts, the answer to the ques-
tion of who the client is may be a combination of the three alternatives:
the beneficiaries, the estate, or the fiduciary. The question is relevant for
a number of reasons, including concerns about:
Confidentiality and Privilege: For example, if one fiduciary reveals to
the attorney (or the attorney discovers in the course of the representa-
tion) that the fiduciary has made a mistake, or acted in a dishonest,
fraudulent, or criminal manner, may (or must) the attorney reveal this
information to, or may it be discovered by, the beneficiaries, or the
other fiduciaries, or a court that supervises the administration, or does
the duty of confidentiality or the concept of privilege preclude such
revelation or discovery?
Conflicts of Interest: To whom must the attorney be loyal if multiple
cofiduciaries or a predecessor and a successor fiduciary disagree, or the
fiduciaries and the beneficiaries disagree, or a fiduciary is a creditor of
the entity or one of several beneficiaries whose interests conflict with
other fiduciaries or beneficiaries, and does the attorney have a conflict
of interest in the context of such representations? In this case the hy-
pothetical poses a potential for conflict among several constituents:
the spouse as against the children (the income beneficiary as against
the remainder beneficiaries and one cofiduciary against another cofidu-
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ciary), and the children as against the one child who is active in the
business. Other conflicts may develop between the remainder benefi-
ciaries and the beneficiaries of the spouse's estate, with respect to
spend-down planning for Medicaid qualification purposes. And tax is-
sues could create conflicts in some plans as well.2
Privity and the Right to Sue the Attorney: Although not specifically an
ethics issue, a very closely related issue is the attorney's liability and
the rights of various parties to assert a cause of action against the attor-
ney, or to dismiss the attorney.
Competence and Loyalty to the Beneficiaries: Must the attorney pro-
tect the beneficiaries' interests as individuals or only indirectly as bene-
ficiaries of the fiduciary entity that the attorney serves, and must the
attorney seek protective measures if, for example, a beneficiary is being
overreached by a third party or by a fiduciary, or appears to require
the appointment of a guardian or conservator to protect the benefici-
ary? For example, if S is at risk and no one else acts, must or may A
do so?
The identity of the client may be confused further if the attorney serves
as a or the only fiduciary or if the attorney also represented the settlor of
the trust or the decedent whose estate is being administered, or the bene-
ficiaries, which may justify various expectations about the attorney's role
that in turn may define that role.
CONFUSION IN EXISTING AUTHORITY
The Comment to Model Rule 1.71 states that:
In estate [or trust] administration the identity of the client may be un-
clear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the
client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or
trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the re-
lationship to the parties involved.
The limited authority on this issue is not consistent and virtually none
comes from ethics disputes. Instead, the reported cases typically involve
ancillary issues like fee disputes, evidentiary privileges, and legal mal-
practice claims raising the question whether beneficiaries have the right
to sue the attorney. The Comment assumes that the attorney may
choose who will be the client when entering into the relationship, prefer-
ably communicated in an engagement letter. Discussed here is the "de-
fault rule" that applies if nothing was said regarding this issue.
A majority of authorities addressing this issue conclude (more or less)
that the personal representative is the client, although many also state
that a duty-akin to a fiduciary duty-runs from the attorney directly to
2. See infra note 77 (regarding tax related conflicts that may arise).
3. For the sake of easy reference, this discussion refers to the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct [hereinafter Model Rules]. The provisions of the prior ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility are substantially the same regarding the primary is-
sues involved, so different results should not obtain regardless of the format adopted in
the relevant jurisdiction.
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the beneficiaries of the fiduciary entity. Unfortunately, the imprecise
manner in which courts and ethics opinions address this question-and
the mixed signals they give by the inaccuracy of their analysis and de-
scription-leaves a great deal of confusion. For example:
[C]ounsel for the personal representative of an estate owes fiduciary
duties not only to the personal representative but also to the benefi-
ciaries of the estate .... This does not mean, however, that counsel
and the beneficiaries occupy an attorney-client relationship. They do
not. "In Florida, the personal representative is the client rather than
the estate or the beneficiaries." Rule 4-1.7, Rules Regulating the Flor-
ida Bar (comment). It follows that counsel does not generate a conflict
of interest in representing the personal representative in a matter sim-
ply because one or more of the beneficiaries takes a position adverse to
that of the personal representative. A contrary position would raise
havoc with the orderly administration of decedents' estates, not to
mention the additional attorney's fees that would be generated.4
Notice should be given to the fact that Florida, by express Rule, has
established that the fiduciary is the client, thereby seeking to minimize
the issues that may arise. A viable approach to this problem is that other
states follow the Florida approach.
Some cases go farther by stating that, although the attorney-client re-
lation is with the fiduciary, the attorney has a fiduciary relation to the
fiduciary that runs to the beneficiaries.' It is not clear whether fiduciary
duties to the fiduciary that run to the beneficiaries differ from fiduciary
duties to the beneficiaries directly.
Other cases state that the attorney for a fiduciary represents the fiduci-
ary entity and not just the fiduciary,6 without clarifying how they per-
ceive the fiduciary entity to be different from the beneficiaries or the
fiduciary alone and whether this direct duty differs from a fiduciary duty.
Yet other authorities are less clear again:
[T]he lawyer, although retained by the executors, has a duty not only
to represent them individually, but also to serve the best interests of the
estate to which they, in turn, owe their fiduciary responsibilities.7
It is not clear whether this is a fiduciary duty and whether it runs only to
the fiduciary or also to the beneficiaries or the estate (and whether that
difference is significant).
Conflicting authorities abound on the essential question. For example,
one American Bar Association ethics opinion states:
[T]here is no indirect fiduciary relationship to the legatees which would
disqualify the attorney from representing the executors in [a] claim for
4. In re Estate of Gory, 570 So.2d 1381, 1383 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (emphasis
added) (order disqualifying personal representative's attorneys in dispute over personal
representative's compensation reversed).
5. See In re Estate of Larson, 694 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Wash. 1985) (en banc).
6. See In re Vetter, 711 P.2d 284, 289 (Wash. 1985) (en banc).
7. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 512 (1979) (emphasis added).
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extra compensation . . . Even though the lawyer representing the
executor may have a duty to see that the assets are preserved and not
wasted and has an obligation to the legatees in that respect... he is
not thereby disqualified to represent the executors in their claim for
compensation .... The attorney's clients are the executors and not the
heirs or beneficiaries.'
Yet various other authorities are directly opposite, expressing opinions
such as:
"[A]n attorney for an estate represents the heirs and distributees and
legatees". . . and is in "a position of trust with respect to all of those
interests in the estate."... Here the... executor, in consulting with
the attorney ... was necessarily acting for both itself as executor and
for the beneficiaries under the will.9
Does this mean the fiduciary is not the client but only an agent con-
tracting on behalf of the beneficiaries, or are they all clients in some form
of joint representation?
[W]hen an attorney undertakes a relationship as adviser to a trustee,
[the attorney] in reality also assumes a relationship with the beneficiary
akin to that between trustee and beneficiary.10
Presumably this refers to the attorney's fiduciary duty to the benefi-
ciaries, and does not mean that the fiduciary is not also a client.
The legal services were performed at the request of the trustee for the
benefit of the beneficiaries .. . . In effect the beneficiaries were the
clients ... as much as the trustees were, and perhaps more so."
Does this mean they all are clients?
[Ain outside attorney.., is technically selected and employed by the
fiduciary in its capacity as such, but ... in fact usually also represents
the beneficiaries of the estate, whose interests or desires may conflict
with the fiduciary's technical duties or limitations in that capacity and
thus with the interests of the fiduciary.'
2
What exception does the court anticipate when it uses the qualifier "usu-
ally," and is this not a fiduciary duty but, instead, a direct attorney-client
relation to the beneficiaries?
8. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1017
(1967) (emphasis added) (attorney for executor may represent executor in petition for
extraordinary fees, the question being conflicts of interest with respect to beneficiaries).
Contra In re Estate of Halas, Jr., 512 N.E.2d 1276 (I1. App. Ct. 1987) (fiduciary duty to
estate beneficiaries conceded in a suit involving attorney fees).
9. Estate of Torian v. Smith, 564 S.W.2d 521, 526 (Ark. 1978) (emphasis added)
(attorney-client privilege does not prevent disclosure to beneficiaries of communications
between attorney and executor).
10. Morales v. Field, DeGoff, Huppert & MacGowan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 239, 244 (Ct.
App. 1979) (emphasis added).
11. Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 712, 714 (Del. Ch. 1976) (emphasis
added).
12. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Dec. C-754
(1964) (emphasis added).
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Some authorities that go further in finding a more direct relation to the
beneficiaries may be distinguishable or explainable on the basis of special
circumstances. For example:
An attorney for a guardianship has two clients: (1) the disabled per-
son's estate both before and after the disabled person's death; and (2)
the guardian in his capacity as guardian.'3
This statement does not establish whether it is intentional or meaningful
that the first client listed was the person's estate and not the person, at
least while the person is alive. Guardianships have created unique re-
sponses and some authorities suggest that there are higher duties on at-
torneys for guardians, for reasons that are not altogether clear on the
basis of the guardian's fiduciary duties to the ward or the attorney's du-
ties to the guardian.
In addition, privity of contract requirements in a few states produce
justifiable but precedentially unreliable results. For example:
A beneficiary whose interest in an estate is vested is in privity with the
fiduciary of the estate, and where such privity exists the attorney for
the fiduciary is not immune from liability to the vested beneficiary for
damages arising from the attorney's negligent performance. 4
The case from which this statement is taken was somewhat unusual be-
cause the applicable state law is the minority position that still requires
privity of contract to sue an attorney for malpractice. It is not clear
whether the court meant that disappointed beneficiaries are clients with a
right to sue or somehow just acquire the privity of the fiduciary or entity
by virtue of vested interests in the entity. It also seems questionable that
a beneficiary's interest must be vested, and this statement does not ad-
dress the rights of an individual who was meant to be a beneficiary but
who was excluded entirely due to an attorney's negligence. 15 Moreover,
consistency is lacking on the privity aspect. For example, according to
one frequently cited decision:
[T]he attorney for the administrator of an estate represents the admin-
istrator, and not the estate .... By assuming a duty to the administra-
tor of an estate, an attorney undertakes to perform services which may
benefit legatees of the estate, but he has no contractual privity with the
beneficiaries of the estate. 16
Third parties, such as beneficiaries or creditors, may be incidental ben-
eficiaries, but incidental benefits may not generate a duty on the attorney.
Particularly in the case of services rendered for the fiduciary of a dece-
13. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 91-24 (1992) (emphasis added).
14. Elam v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 541 N.E.2d 616, 618 (Ohio 1989) (a malpractice case
brought by beneficiaries).
15. Contrary to Elam is Weingarten v. Warren, 753 F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(attorney for trustee incurs fiduciary duties that run to the beneficiaries but those benefi-
ciaries are not in privity of contract with the attorney for malpractice liability purposes).
16. Goldberg v. Frye, 266 Cal. Rptr. 483, 488 (Ct. App. 1990).
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dent's estate, we would apprehend great danger in finding stray duties
in favor of beneficiaries. Typically in estate administration conflicting
interests vie for recognition. The very purpose of the fiduciary is to
serve the interests of the estate, not to promote the objectives of one
group of legatees over the interests of conflicting claimants. The fidu-
ciary's attorney, as his legal adviser, is faced with the same task of
disposition of conflicts. It is of course the purpose and obligation of
both the fiduciary and his attorney to serve the estate. In such capac-
ity they are obligated to communicate with, and to arbitrate conflicting
claims among, those interested in the estate. While the fiduciary in the
performance of this service may be exposed to the potential of mal-
practice (and hence is subject to surcharge when his administration is
completed), the attorney by definition represents only one party: thefi-
duciary. It would be very dangerous to conclude that the attorney,
through performance of his service to the administrator and by way of
communication to estate beneficiaries, subjects himself to claims of
negligence from the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries are entitled to even-
handed and fair administration by the fiduciary. They are not owed a
duty directly by the fiduciary's attorney.1 7
Are the beneficiaries owed an indirect duty by the attorney and, if so,
what would that mean?
When an attorney is employed to render services in securing the pro-
bate of a will or settling an estate, he acts as attorney for the personal
representative and not for the estate.'8
Does this mean there are no duties to the beneficiaries?
As illustrated in these snippets from various authorities, the way
courts and ethics committees describe the relationship with the fiduciary,
with the beneficiaries, and with the entity itself differs rather dramati-
cally, generating uncertainty and confusion that prevents any real under-
standing of the attorney's role in those cases in which the question of the
identity of the client is relevant. In an effort to add meaning to this quag-
mire, a leading treatise on the subject suggests that the fiduciary entity is
the client and that the fiduciary is a 'orimary" client while the benefi-
ciaries are "derivative" clients.'9 One author of that treatise also postu-
lates that one way to view an attorney who represents a guardian may be
to regard the ward as a derivative client,20 arguing that an attorney for
17. Id. at 489-90 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
18. In re Estate of Wagner, 386 N.W.2d 448, 450 (Neb. 1986) (emphasis added). See
also Lasky, Haas, Cohler & Munter v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. Rptr. 205 (Ct. App.
1985) (court's holding that beneficiaries could not discover communications between
trustee and attorney was dicta because of its prior holding that work-product never given
to the trustee cannot be discovered by the beneficiaries in any event).
19. 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Hand-
book on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 1.3:108 (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter
Hazard & Hodes].
20. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Triangular Lawyer Relationships: An Exploratory Analy-
sis, 1 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 15 (1987), citing Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz.
1976) (attorney for guardian has a duty to protect ward from injury by guardian of which
attorney knew or should have known).
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"the party in the dominant position" has a duty to "the party in the
position of dependency."'"
Treatment of the fiduciary entity as the client is the least common res-
olution of this issue in the reported case law, but is not without support.
[T]he attorney's client is the estate, rather than the personal representa-
tive. The fact that the probate court must approve the attorney's fees
for services rendered on behalf of the estate and that the fees are paid
out of the estate further supports this conclusion.22
It is not clear whether the estate as a client is any different from the
fiduciary or the beneficiaries as clients, although the resolution of a few
issues, particularly involving confidential information, may be easier to
justify under this formulation.
POSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS
Existing precedent obviously is confused, perhaps because existing au-
thority represents an attempt to deal with the client identity question in
too many contexts and with too many competing equities or objectives.
In this context, the American Bar Association Real Property, Probate
and Trust Section appointed a study committee ("the ABA Study Com-
mittee") to evaluate this question (along with several others) and to sug-
gest an interpretation that considers all relevant issues in a consolidated
manner.
ABA Study Committee Report
The ABA Study Committee produced a Report that embraces three
essential elements:
21. Professor Hazard, in a letter to the author dated December 2, 1991, also stated:
The attorney-client privilege ordinarily does not shield the fiduciary from dis-
closure in favor of the beneficiaries . . .regardless of the identity of the cli-
ent....
Most probate lawyers ... view their relationship with the fiduciary as not
only confidential but personal. However much they may wish that this is the
law, it is not, any more than corporate counsel has a personal relationship with
the CEO.
Letter from Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. to Jeffrey N. Pennell (Dec. 2, 1992) (on file with
author). See Gump v. Wells Fargo Bank, 237 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Ct. App. 1987) (subse-
quently decertified); Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington
Star Co., 543 F. Supp. 906 (D.D.C. 1982) (attorneys for ERISA plan denied asserted
privilege against participants' discovery of communications with plan fiduciary, the court
stating that the client of the attorney for the plan fiduciary is theplan beneficiaries), citing
Donovan v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
22. Steinway v. Bolden, 185 Mich. App. 234, 238 (1990) (emphasis added) (suit by
successor personal representative to assert attorney liability for defalcation of prior repre-
sentative, defended on grounds that only the prior representative could sue as the attor-
ney's client; jurisdiction of the court was established on the basis of the successor's right
to sue because the estate and not the prior representative was the attorney's client). See
also Rule 1.7 cmt., supra text accompanying note 3 ("Under one view, the client is... the
estate or trust, including its beneficiaries").
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Absent an agreement otherwise, the attorney's client is the fiduciary,
not the entity nor the beneficiaries.
The attorney has no duties to the beneficiaries other than those
prohibitions ("negative" duties) that flow from the fact that the attor-
ney's client is a fiduciary whose own duties of good faith, impartiality,
and to avoid breaches of trust apply to the attorney as well.
The duty of confidentiality does not prevent the attorney from shar-
ing information with the beneficiaries to the extent the beneficiaries
could obtain that information in litigation and the attorney-client priv-
ilege would not protect it from their discovery.
The first element reflects the vast weight of authority. And although the
second element attempts to cast the attorney's duties in a manner that
minimizes the appearance that the attorney has obligations to others
than the fiduciary, this element too is not a major departure from existing
authority. But the third element of the ABA Study Committee Report is
controversial, although it is thought to be necessary if the attorney is to
deal with the most troubling aspect of this form of representation.
To illustrate, assume under the facts of the hypothetical that S contin-
ued to deteriorate mentally and that the other cotrustees (children by the
settlor's prior marriage) essentially are in charge of trust administration.
Without seeking A's advice and contrary to the wishes of S as cotrustee
and beneficiary, they converted trust investments to minimize income
and loaned trust funds to the family business (which one of them oper-
ates). A learned of both acts and advised the cotrustees that they were
improper under fiduciary law and must be rectified. A was told, how-
ever, that no changes would be made "because S is too far gone to com-
plain" and all the other beneficiaries concurred with these actions. Now
A must consider what action, if any, is required. More specifically, A
must decide whether to reveal the information received from the cotrust-
ees that discloses these improprieties and, if so, to whom. The cotrustees'
position is that A is their attorney, that the information is confidential
and therefore may not be revealed to a court or other authority, and that
A therefore must keep quiet about A's conclusions concerning their
actions.
Because preservation of this information benefits the cotrustees at the
expense of S, which the ABA Study Committee concluded is the wrong
balance in this conflict, the Report formulated a construct that allows A
to act affirmatively to rectify the impropriety, rather than merely with-
drawing from the representation. In concluding that information not
privileged from discovery by S in litigation is not protected by the confi-
dentiality prohibitions of Model Rule 1.6 from disclosure to S or a proper
court, the Study Committee Report is contrary to some authority on
point.2" Nevertheless, it is thought to be a proper resolution of this diffi-
23. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 202
(1940); Ala. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 89-105 (1989). It also may create unanticipated
evidentiary consequences. See infra note 46.
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cult issue and it finds some antecedent in a similar rule adopted in the
State of Washington in an effort to address the notion that withdrawal
may leave the real parties in interest in the lurch.
Washington's version of Model Rule 1.6 was amended to add a subsec-
tion (c), authorizing an attorney to reveal a breach of fiduciary duty by a
court-appointed fiduciary. That amendment is not as expansive as the
ABA Study Committee Report, however, because it reflects a compro-
mise that allows disclosure only to a court and only if the fiduciary was
appointed by a court. Like the ABA Study Committee Report, the
Washington Rule neither mandates disclosure nor specifies when the at-
torney would be justified in not disclosing.
The ABA Study Committee Report reflects the determination that re-
garding the fiduciary as the client creates a problem that various resolu-
tions only partially address. For example, because it is limited to court-
appointed fiduciaries, Washington Rule 1.6(c) does not confront the
problem in the full spectrum of cases that could arise, including that
presented by the hypothetical. Unfortunately, both the Washington reso-
lution and the ABA Study Committee Report leave open the specter of
attorney liability if the confidence could be but is not revealed.
For example, an Illinois ethics opinion states that an attorney is sub-
ject to discipline and to civil liability if the attorney does not affirmatively
disclose information about a fiduciary's defalcation."4 This puts the at-
torney in a difficult position if the fiduciary is regarded as the attorney's
client, even if the duty of confidentiality does not preclude disclosure,
because it requires the attorney to exercise discretion whether to turn on
the client in favor of other, more important, principles.
In this respect a mandatory disclosure rule rather than authority to
disclose would be easier for the attorney to apply. But a mandatory duty
to disclose is problematic in its own right because it might cause the
attorney to become a fiduciary watchdog, duplicating functions per-
formed by the fiduciary to permit the attorney to know what a reason-
ably competent attorney "should know," therefore permitting the
attorney to comply with the duty of disclosure. In addition to the added
costs this might generate, in some cases mandatory disclosure also could
be needlessly harmful because it could destroy the beneficiary's trust in a
fiduciary that made and corrected an innocent mistake. Without the
flexibility to exercise discretion, such as to determine that disclosure
serves little purpose and could generate significant harm, the attorney
presumably would report all fiduciary misconduct just to be certain that
24. See Ill. State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 91-24 (1992) (guardian asserted ownership of
monies that attorney believed belonged to the ward's estate). Contra 4 Austin W. Scott &
William F. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 326.4 (4th ed. 1989) [hereinafter Scott on
Trusts] (attorney not liable to beneficiaries for participation in a fiduciary's breach of
fiduciary duty unless the attorney knew or should have known that the attorney was
assisting the fiduciary to commit that breach; knowledge alone without knowing assist-
ance is not adequate to generate attorney liability).
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the attorney does not incur personal liability. The ABA Study Commit-
tee concluded that this took the rule too far.
Several other aspects of the ABA Study Committee Report are signifi-
cant. For example, it recognizes that justifiable expectations on the part
of various individuals may result in multiple and, in some cases, conflict-
ing representations. To illustrate, the hypothetical assumes that there
was no prior representation by A of any of the parties or of the decedent
and thus precludes the issue whether any prior representation generates
justified expectations about who the attorney represents. The reality,
however, is that many cases involve attorneys who represented a dece-
dent during life and various surviving family members, which may re-
quire a Model Rule 1.7 or 1.9 analysis involving conflicts of interest
generated by a former representation or by the representation of multiple
current clients. At the least it may require the attorney to act affirma-
tively to disabuse individuals from assuming the attorney represents
them if the attorney does not intend to maintain an attorney-client rela-
tion with anyone other than the fiduciary. In a case such as that posed
by the hypothetical, this could create a problem if the individual with the
justifiable expectation is unable to comprehend the attorney's disclaimer
of representation or is unable to engage another attorney.
Moreover, the ABA Study Committee Report generates a potential
need to obtain consent to conflicts of interest involving former clients or
multiple current clients. To illustrate, consider two modifications to the
hypothetical. Assume first that A previously represented both D and S
while D was alive and therefore either has a former or a current client
relation with S.2 Assume second that S is named to act alone as D's
personal representative and, quite naturally, wants A as the family attor-
ney to assist in that fiduciary engagement.
Recognizing that administration of the estate may require A to render
opinions about the propriety of S taking certain actions or making cer-
tain elections that will impact the relative entitlement of the beneficiaries
of the present and future interests (being S and the children of D's former
marriage), A determines that there may be a conflict of interest because
of A's former or current representation of S as an individual. So A con-
tacts S seeking consent to this potential conflict, stating that A may be
called upon to render opinions to S as personal representative that are
not necessarily in the best interests of S as an individual. In the role of a
25. Often it is not clear when an estate planning representation ends with respect to
clients who still are living, so it is not possible to know (without more, such as facts
showing that A sent D and S an "exit" letter terminating their relation, which is very
unlikely, or that S has engaged personal counsel other than A) whether A's representa-
tion of S terminated at some point before D died or is continuing (but perhaps "dor-
mant", in the sense that S may not want A to perform any specific services but continues
to regard A as S's attorney). Whether the representation of S is terminated or ongoing,
the Model Rules require a consent, under Rule 1.7 by both S as an individual and by the
fiduciaries as current clients, or under Rule 1.9 by S alone as the former client.
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present or former client, S consents under Model Rule 1.7 or Model Rule
1.9 to this potential conflict.
In turn, A also states to S as personal representative that, because of
A's former or current representation of S as an individual, A might
render opinions to S as personal representative that might be influenced
by A's representation of S as an individual. If Model Rule 1.7 is applica-
ble, requiring consent of both current clients, the issue is whether S, act-
ing as personal representative, can give an effective consent to this
conflict.26 If S cannot give an effective consent in the fiduciary capacity,
because S is the source of the conflict that generates this problem and
therefore has a fiduciary conflict of interest, then who could give the req-
uisite consent on behalf of the fiduciary or the entity? In many cases the
identity of the future interest beneficiaries is not ascertainable and, even
if it were, their consent might not be obtainable or effective because they
are minors or have only contingent future interests. S as fiduciary is obli-
gated by fiduciary law principles not to allow personal interests to affect
fiduciary judgments,2 7 including the grant of consent in this situation,
and could be sued for any breach of this fiduciary duty. But A's ethical
duty is not informed by S's fiduciary law duty and litigation to redress a
fiduciary law breach of duty would not cure any consequences of A's
unconsented conflict. Thus, it may not be adequate to rest the ethics
analysis on fiduciary law principles. Indeed, A's ethical violation could
precede and need not depend on any compensable damages flowing from
S's breach in granting the consent.
This form of conflict involving multiple representations occurs with
regularity in fiduciary administrations. Many practitioners and probably
most clients would be appalled at the notion that an attorney cannot
assist in a fiduciary representation if the attorney has a current or former
client relation with any beneficiary, without obtaining an effective con-
sent, and that an effective consent is impossible to obtain if the benefici-
ary also is acting as fiduciary. Moreover, a suggestion that a successor or
temporary fiduciary be appointed to give consent likely would be dis-
missed by most observers as ranging from unnecessary under fiduciary
law constraints to impossible because the objective temporary fiduciary
should conclude that consent never should be given.
In the context of conflicts of interest, the ABA Study Committee Re-
port recognizes that an attorney should advise the fiduciary about the
duty of impartiality that both the fiduciary and the attorney must meet.
For example, the hypothetical posits facts that make impartial adminis-
26. If S is a former client because A's representation of D and S already terminated, S
need not consent in the capacity as personal representative because, under Model Rule
1.9, only the former client must consent to A's potential conflict of interest in represent-
ing a new client. Any effort at this time to cause Model Rule 1.9 to apply in lieu of Model
Rule 1.7 by A terminating the client relation with S as an individual is not likely to be
effective.
27. See 2A Scott on Trusts, supra note 24, §§ 170, 183.
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tration unrealistic, which may require A to withdraw from the represen-
tation or to alert all potentially affected beneficiaries that conflicts may
exist and that they may wish to obtain their own counsel to protect their
interests. It is clear under the ABA Study Committee Report that A
may not participate in any action by a fiduciary that constitutes a breach
of trust, either by direct assistance, by filing misleading or false reports,
or otherwise deceiving the beneficiaries or any supervisory court, but it is
not clear that A must withdraw if S as the fiduciary merely has a conflict
of interest.
The ABA Study Committee Report rejects the notion of an affirmative
duty on A to inform the beneficiaries or any supervisory court of any
impropriety, and most attorneys probably would not reveal information
regarding conflicts of interest, on the theory that it is not a serious breach
of fiduciary duties absent some affirmative act by the fiduciary. Thus, if
the fiduciary's acts do not involve a clear defalcation (for example, if the
facts show only that investments are questionable or that reasonable fidu-
ciaries might differ on an appropriate exercise of discretion under specific
facts and circumstances), the attorney is left with discretion but no duty
to disclose, which creates potential liability as the price for having flexi-
bility. These conflict of interest concerns, hypothetical as they may be in
garden variety situations, nevertheless may so infect a fiduciary represen-
tation that the attorney cannot ethically assist in the fiduciary adminis-
tration if there is a prior or current representation of any of the
beneficiaries. None of this is addressed adequately by the ABA Study
Committee Report.
Aside from the conflict of interest situation, the ABA Study Commit-
tee Report recognizes that a fiduciary may engage an attorney and, by
agreement, preclude the attorney from revealing the fiduciary's confi-
dences. In such a case it probably is necessary for the fiduciary to pay
the attorney out of its own funds, rather than entity funds, at least until it
is determined that the fiduciary is entitled to reimbursement for its rea-
sonable expenses incurred in the administration and that these include
reasonable attorney fees. In addition, although it is likely that the fiduci-
ary would not engage an attorney with a prior involvement in the situa-
tion or who has a current or former client conflict, it may be necessary
for the attorney to dispel any expectations that the beneficiaries may de-
velop that the attorney for the fiduciary represents their interests.
Finally, absent an agreement otherwise, the ABA Study Committee
Report recognizes that there are no secrets as between cofiduciaries,
meaning that the attorney may and potentially must share all relevant
information obtained from one with any other cofiduciaries. In the hy-
pothetical this would permit A to reveal confidential information re-
ceived from the children as cotrustees to S as a cotrustee. This revelation
is made possible by virtue of their cofiduciary status and does not depend
on any determination that the lack of privilege allows this disclosure to S
as a beneficiary. Unfortunately, in the hypothetical, given S's deteriora-
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tion, even if A may disclose this information to S it is not likely to pro-
duce any protection of S's interests.
Other Exceptions to the Duty of Confidentiality
An attorney's ability to reveal a defalcating fiduciary's wrongdoing is
one of the most important consequences of determining who the attorney
represents and with what duties and limitations. Model Rule 1.6 defines
an attorney's duty of confidentiality and provides several exceptions that
may help to define or avoid problems generated under various alternative
resolutions to the client identity issue. If applicable and sufficiently com-
prehensive, these resolutions could free the analysis of this issue from this
one significant element and permit consideration of other alternatives.
One exception to the duty of confidentiality is found in Model Rule
1.6(a), which authorizes the revelation of information that is "impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation." For example, fidu-
ciaries normally are obligated by state law to account to the beneficiaries,
to a supervisory court, or to both.2" Information provided to the attor-
ney by the fiduciary may be subject to disclosure by the attorney in com-
pliance with that duty. This is not to say, however, that disclosure by the
attorney is impliedly authorized if the fiduciary has chosen not to make
an accounting or has decided to account in an incomplete, dishonest, or
other misleading manner. It is clear under Model Rule 3.3(a) that an
attorney may not assist a fiduciary in misleading a tribunal and must
disclose material facts to a tribunal if necessary to avoid assisting in a
fiduciary's criminal or fraudulent act. And Model Rule 4.1 prohibits an
attorney from making a false statement of material fact or law to a third
party and requires disclosure of material facts to avoid assisting a client's
criminal or fraudulent act. But it is not clear that the Model Rule 3.3
duty of candor to a tribunal is applicable if, for example, the attorney did
not assist in the fiduciary's defalcation or its cover up, and it especially is
not helpful if no court is involved because administration is un-
supervised. And the Model Rule 4.1 duty to others is triggered only if
the attorney affirmatively acted, either by making false statements or by
assisting the fiduciary, and rectification following assistance to the fiduci-
ary as opposed to the attorney having lied is subject to the Model Rule
1.6 confidentiality prohibition. Thus, this first exception does not pro-
vide an adequate escape from considerations of the duty of
confidentiality.
A second exception to the duty of confidentiality is the Model Rule
1.6(b)(1) authority to reveal confidential information to the extent neces-
sary "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the law-
yer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm." Although this provision is not broad enough to authorize disclo-
sures against the fiduciary's prohibition in a typical fiduciary defalcation
28. See id. § 173.
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situation, it was the subject of heated debate when the Model Rules were
adopted and various adopting states may permit disclosure under their
expanded versions. For example, an alternative provision to Model Rule
1.6 would have permitted revelation if necessary "(1) to prevent the cli-
ent from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that ... is likely to
result in... substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another; [or] (2) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or
fraudulent act in the furtherance of which the lawyer's services had been
used.",29 Although the American Bar Association rejected this proposal
in adopting the Model Rules, many states modified their particular ver-
sions of Model Rule 1.6 to incorporate it.30 In those states, certain dis-
closures (for example, to preclude a fiduciary from embezzling) may be
authorized without the need to characterize the fiduciary representation
in a manner like the ABA Study Committee Report.
A third exception is found in Model Rule 1.6(b)(2), which permits dis-
closure of confidential information to the extent necessary "to establish a
defense to a ... civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in
which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any pro-
ceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client." Argua-
bly,31 this exception permits an attorney to disclose information needed
to establish a preemptive defense to civil liability to which the attorney
would be exposed under state law if the attorney otherwise failed to alert
beneficiaries or others to a fiduciary defalcation. Thus, if state law could
impose liability on an attorney who did not rectify a fiduciary defalcation
that the attorney knew about or should have known about, 32 the argu-
ment is that the attorney may make the necessary disclosure. Otherwise,
it simply is untenable to create a duty and with it the potential for liabil-
ity and the certain loss of time, money, and reputation in asserting a
defense thereto, without permitting disclosures that allow the attorney to
comply with that duty. It seems pretty clear, however, from reading the
Comment to Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) that this exception was created solely
in anticipation of an attorney defending against actions brought against
the attorney for malpractice or other wrongdoing and not to preempt or
rectify events that might generate such liability. 33
29. (Emphasis added). See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud:
Death and Revival of a Professional Norm, 33 Emory L.J. 271, 296-97 (1984) [hereinafter
Client Fraud].
30. See Hazard & Hodes, supra note 19, App. 4 for a summary of state modifications.
31. See id. § 1.6:306; Report on the Debate Over W!hether There Should Be an Excep-
tion to Confidentiality for Rectifying a Crime or Fraud, 20 Fordham Urb. LJ. 857 (1993);
but see American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibility, Annotated
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 97 (2d ed. 1992).
32. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
33. Cf Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 73 cmt. h at 33 (Council Draft
No. 10, Nov. 17, 1993) (adopting position that attorney does not have a duty to a non-
client to disclose client confidences merely because "someone might advance an argument
that the ... client's conduct constitutes a crime or fraud," suggesting that preemptive
acts based on speculation about potential liability are not authorized).
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Entity as Client
Another alternative was considered by the ABA Study Committee
that would allow disclosure of confidences without deviating from ac-
cepted notions regarding confidentiality or application of any exception
to Model Rule 1.6. This alternative was rejected, however, as lacking
sufficient support in the law. It would regard a fiduciary entity as a sepa-
rate jural personality with an identity and status as the client in the same
manner as a corporation or partnership is a client. Under this entity
representation alternative, each entity acts through an "agent"34 or rep-
resentative (a corporate officer, a managing partner, or the fiduciary) but
the attorney ultimately is responsible to the entity and its constituents
(shareholders and board of directors, partners, and beneficiaries) rather
than to the agent who hired the attorney. Moreover, the attorney is au-
thorized to disclose otherwise confidential information to constituents of
the entity on an "as needed" basis. This alternative has not been consid-
ered by many courts-probably because of the historical notion that a
decedent's estate or a trust has no legal existence 35-but it is recognized
that a fiduciary entity such as an estate or a trust is a separate legal entity
for tax and other purposes.36 This approach has a number of advantages
recommending it and, because it is somewhat novel, the balance of this
article is devoted to an explanation of the concept.
Regarding an entity as the attorney's client is addressed in Model Rule
1.13, Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 212, and Model
34. It is not suggested by this reference that the fiduciary is subject to the law of
Agency. The Restatement (Second) of the Law of Agency § 14B (1958) provides that an
agent and a trustee both are fiduciaries and, in some cases, an individual can be both "[i]f
he has such title and also holds the property subject to the control of another." Id. § 14B
cmt. b. The law of agency is not essential for purposes of this analysis and is not consid-
ered further.
35. The notion is that a plaintiff cannot sue a fiduciary estate, which has no legal
existence independent of the fiduciary that represents it. See, e.g., In re Estate of Wagner,
386 N.W.2d 448, 450 (Neb. 1986): "Attorneys represent people. There is no such posi-
tion known as 'attorney of an estate,'" citing In re Ogier, 35 P. 900 (Cal. 1894).
Although the most common organization that is recognized as an entity for purposes of
Model Rule 1.13 is the corporation, which has an existence recognized at law by virtue of
incorporation, less formalistic entities such as partnerships also are regarded as entities
for purposes of Model Rule 1.13. Fiduciary entities such as estates and trusts, which in
traditional property parlance constitute property held subject to the administration of a
fiduciary with duties to beneficiaries, are recognized as separate jural personalities for
purposes such as taxation. Thus, statements such as that quoted from Wagner are anti-
quarian and at least the first sentence of that quote clearly is wrong, as shown by the fact
that attorneys represent entities such as corporations and partnerships and not individual
people. Furthermore, just as a corporation or a partnership designates an individual to
deal with the world on its behalf, a fiduciary entity exists vis-a-vis the world through the
fiduciary, making the analogy appropriate for these purposes.
36. See, e.g., Estate of Hubberd v. Comm'r, 99 T.C. 335 (1992) (estate as an entity,
rather than its beneficiaries or their fiduciary, is a party eligible for an award of litigation
costs). Other circumstances in which the entity is recognized might include wrongful
death recoveries by an estate on behalf of the decedent in a survival act state, and tort or
contract actions in which the fiduciary clearly was acting solely in a fiduciary capacity.
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Code EC 5-18, which apply to the representation of an organization and,
if adapted to this situation, would treat the attorney as representing the
trust or estate as a jural personality. According to Model Rule 1.13(a),
"[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the or-
ganization acting through its duly authorized constituents." Restate-
ment § 212(1) specifies that "[a] lawyer employed or retained to
represent an organization represents the interests of the organization as
defined by its responsible agents acting pursuant to the organization's
decision-making procedures." Were it possible to regard this approach
as applicable to a fiduciary representation, the fiduciary would be the
responsible agent and the beneficiaries and any involved court would be
the constituents.
For purposes of the entity representation rule, an "organization" need
not be incorporated (although the normal application of this rule is in the
context of corporate counsel); an organization may include any entity
"with a recognizable form, internal organization, and relative perma-
nence. Many organizations are recognized as entities for other legal pur-
poses, but such recognition is not invariably required for purposes of'
Model Rule 1.13, 3 under which "even a small group informally organ-
ized for a limited purpose can be considered an entity.... If the group is
seen as having an identity apart from the individuals who comprise it, it
can have separate status as a 'client' in the relationship with the
lawyer.",3 8
Indeed, partnerships have been regarded as organizations within the
meaning of Model Rule 1.13, recognizing that "the rationale behind
[Rule 1.13] is that an organization will have goals and objectives that
may, or may not, be consistent with the goals and objectives of all or
some of its members or other constituents."39 This describes a fiduciary
relationship in which the beneficiaries are the constituents, albeit a differ-
ence between these entities normally regarded as organizations and the
typical fiduciary entity is that the beneficiaries d'd not come together to
form the fiduciary entity, as normally is the case with a corporation or
partnership. Nothing in the operation of Model Rule 1.13 suggests, how-
ever, that voluntariness is a requisite to recognition as an organization
for purposes of applying this rule. Indeed, many shareholders in corpo-
37. Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers § 212, cint. a at 142 (Tent. Draft No.
4, Apr. 10, 1991).
38. Hazard & Hodes, supra note 19, § 1.13:103, at 390.2 (Supp. 1993).
39. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361
(1991). Curiously, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a partnership is not regarded as the proper party and instead its partners are
deemed the real parties in interest. See Carden v. Arkoma Assoc., 494 U.S. 185 (1990).
But to test diversity with respect to a decedent's estate the fiduciary and the beneficiaries
are ignored and the decedent's domicile is determinative. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(2) (1988).
Thus, civil procedure notions arguably should not drive these issues in the ethics arena.
In addition, perfect analogues are not likely to be found for any alternative proposed.
although an analogue probably can be found to support most any reasonable proposition
that can be supported under the ethics rules alone.
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rations acquire their status involuntarily (for example, by inheritance)
and this status does not alter the fundamental nature of the corporation
as an organization subject to Model Rule 1.13.
The essential element of the entity representation precept is that the
attorney represents the entity and not any of the entity's responsible
agents or constituents individually. Because the attorney may deal with
the various agents or constituents rather than with the entity proper, it
may appear that an attorney-client relationship exists with them individ-
ually, but this approach regards them as acting only on behalf of the
entity. "When an agent for a principal hires another agent for the princi-
pal, the second individual does not become a subagent of the first. In-
stead, the two become co-agents, and owe allegiance to their common
principal rather than to one another."40 The entity is the principal and
the agent who hires the attorney, such as a corporate officer or, in this
analysis, the fiduciary, is merely the entity's representative, employing
the attorney as another agent of the entity. The attorney is paid by the
entity using assets of the entity and not assets of the agent who hired the
attorney, and serves the entity rather than the agent who hired the attor-
ney. Although the attorney may incur responsibility to various constitu-
ents of the entity (such as the fiduciary or the beneficiaries) as
"derivative" clients, under the entity representation alternative the or-
ganization or fiduciary entity is the primary client to whom the attor-
ney's duties are owed.
As perceived in this manner, the fiduciary who hired the attorney (in-
deed, if a corporate fiduciary is involved, the employee acting as an agent
of the corporate fiduciary that hired the attorney) is merely another
agent of the true client (the entity) and could not, for example, dismiss
the attorney in an effort to cover up any wrongdoing. The attorney, if
unable to persuade the fiduciary in any respect (such as to correct a
wrong), independently must determine what is best for the entity and, if
necessary, "go up the chain of command to resolve the matter."'41
The existence of cofiduciaries, even if they do not agree, does not com-
plicate this analysis any more than if a corporation had multiple dishar-
monious corporate officers. Indeed, the entity representation theory may
make it easier to resolve conflicts that otherwise might infect a cofiduci-
ary representation than a rule regarding the cofiduciaries as the clients.
Thus, for example, in the hypothetical with cofiduciaries who have con-
flicts of interest, A need not choose between them nor withdraw if the
personal interests or objectives of the fiduciaries or the beneficiaries be-
come irreconcilable. Indeed, at that point, A's objective representation
of the fiduciary entity, independent of the wishes of the respective fiduci-
aries, may be indispensable to proper fiduciary administration.
40. Hazard & Hodes, supra note 19, § 1.13:105, at 393, citing Restatement (Second)
of Agency § 5(1) (1958) (emphasis in original).
41. Hazard & Hodes, supra note 19, § 1.13:106, at 395.
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Although the "chain of command" seems relatively clear in the con-
text of a corporation (the attorney normally deals with the corporation's
officers, who report to its board of directors), the lack of a clear hierarchy
in a fiduciary setting is no more troublesome than in the context of other
entities, such as a partnership, in which the chain of command equally is
obscure. Just as there are situations in which the attorney for a corpora-
tion is entitled to carry information to shareholders regarding self-deal-
ing or other wrongs committed by corporate officers 42 or majority
shareholders, the analogy to carrying information to beneficiaries of a
fiduciary entity seems natural. In the fiduciary setting, if a court is in-
volved, it also seems natural to regard the court as being a higher author-
ity, like a board of directors vis-a-vis corporate officers.
In each setting, it is only within this chain of command (as compared
to taking information entirely outside the entity), that the disclosure of
information obtained in the representation is not improper under the en-
tity representation theory. The key to this analysis is to regard the fiduci-
ary as an agent and the beneficiaries as constituents of the estate or trust
and apply a rule that "[ilnformation given to the lawyer by agents of the
entity must be made available to the entity when it is in the best interest
of the entity."43 "Rule 1.13 ... is not a rule about disclosures outside an
entity, but serves primarily as an analytic tool for understanding relation-
ships and hierarchies within an entity, and the problem of communicat-
ing with a client which in reality is only a nonexistent fiction."" This
describes a fiduciary entity as well as it describes a corporation or a
partnership.
This vision of the client representation issue that regards the fiduciary
entity as a separate jural personality and treats it as the client has several
potential advantages. One is that it clarifies the attorney's responsibilities
to the various parties who have an interest in the administration. Rather
than trying to establish the meaning and extent of fiduciary, derivative,
or ancillary duties to the beneficiaries, or the ability to reveal otherwise
confidential information if the fiduciary is regarded as the client, the at-
torney would know that legal representation of a fiduciary entity is
guided by the same focus that guides the fiduciary administration itself-
the best interests of the entity and the beneficiaries for which it is held -
evaluated in an objective sense rather than with an view toward protec-
tion of some but not all of the various constituents involved.
A second advantage is relevant in those cases that involve actual fidu-
ciary misconduct. By regarding the entity as the client rather than the
fiduciary or the beneficiaries, the attorney avoids the question of the at-
torney's ability to reveal a fiduciary's breach of duty. It also makes it
more clear to whom the attorney owes its fidelity if a conflict of interest
arises. To permit disclosure under the ABA Study Committee approach
42. See id. § 1.13:403.
43. Id. § 1.13:107, at 396.
44. Id § 1.13:111, at 401.
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requires acceptance of its conclusion that the duty of confidentiality does
not apply as between the fiduciary and either the beneficiaries or a court,
to the extent the information could be discovered by the beneficiaries.
That interpretation is not necessary if the entity is regarded as the client
because it is clear that confidentiality does not apply within an organiza-
tion or entity to the extent explicitly or impliedly authorized to carry out
the representation or to prevent substantial injury to the organization.
To the extent disclosure is reasonably necessary in the best interests of
the organization, and other constituents have a need to know, the attor-
ney may disclose otherwise confidential information without exposure.45
The ABA Study Committee Report also generates an issue whether the
attorney-client privilege that otherwise would protect against discovery
by outsiders is lost for all purposes by virtue of discretionary disclosure
to beneficiaries.46 The entity representation alternative avoids this issue
as well.
45. See Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule 1.13(b) and cmt.
46. Under the ABA Study Committee proposal the attorney-client privilege that
would not apply as against discovery by beneficiaries, as discussed supra note 22, never-
theless would exist with respect to third party discovery. This privilege against outsiders
would be lost following disclosure of privileged confidential information to a nonclient,
the notion being that, to the extent there has been disclosure, there no longer is confiden-
tial or privileged information upon which the privilege can work. See I McCormick on
Evidence § 93, at 342 (4th ed. 1992). Thus, the issue is whether the protection of the
privilege is lost for all purposes if otherwise privileged information is disclosed to a benefi-
ciary who is not regarded as the attorney's client. See infra text accompanying note 56
regarding the question whether beneficiaries are clients of the attorney in garden variety
fiduciary representation situations.
The attorney-client privilege is not lost to the extent otherwise confidential information
is disclosed to constituents in an entity representation. See Upjohn Co. v. United States,
449 U.S. 383 (1981). Moreover, loss of the privilege would not occur under the ABA
Study Committee approach if disclosure to beneficiaries is regarded as permissible. Thus,
if it is correct for evidence law purposes that information is not privileged as against the
beneficiaries, then the attorney-client privilege is not deemed waived when that informa-
tion is disclosed to a beneficiary. But the ABA Study Committee approach puts a poten-
tially high price on an attorney's voluntary revelation of fiduciary confidences to
beneficiaries who are not the attorney's client if disclosure to them is not regarded as an
exception to the waiver rule in the same manner as disclosure within an entity representa-
tion. This issue is not addressed by the ABA Study Committee Report.
In the only case found directly on point, In re Estate of Baker, 528 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Surr.
1988) (surviving spouse as beneficiary of estate sought disclosure of additional documents
following revelation of certain information regarding the fiduciary's administration,
claiming the attorney-client privilege asserted by the fiduciary was waived as to the
spouse by virtue of prior disclosures on the same subject), the court held that the privilege
was not lost, but the rationale for its holding is uncertain because the opinion referred to
two different grounds upon which it may be held that the attorney-client privilege is not
available to a fiduciary as against a beneficiary and the court did not indicate which
ground it was relying upon.
The attorney-client privilege has been held to be unavailable to a fiduciary on
the grounds that: (1) the privilege should not be asserted against those for
whose benefit the legal advice is sought, and (2) both the fiduciary and the bene-
ficiaries are the clients of the attorney and the privilege may not be asserted
between clients who consult an attorney on a matter of common interest ....
This court is of the opinion that a fiduciary has an obligation to disclose the
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A third advantage of the entity representation alternative lies in the
fact that the law informing the resolution of questions that arise in repre-
senting entities such as corporations is relatively well-developed and can
be relied upon to inform the resolution of analogous issues that arise in
the fiduciary context.
As in most cases involving an attorney's representation of a corpora-
tion, in the vast majority of fiduciary representation cases no conflict or
breach exists and it does not matter whether a technical classification
regards the client as the fiduciary as opposed to the beneficiaries or the
entity. But in cases in which the issue is significant, regarding the fiduci-
ary as the client means the attorney is conflicted if the beneficiaries' inter-
ests are adverse and, at some point in the representation, the fiduciary's
negligence, misconduct, or objection to the attorney's advice might re-
quire the attorney to withdraw from the representation rather than take
other actions that might be more beneficial to the various constituents
(beneficiaries or creditors, for example) or the entity itself.47 Without the
ability to disclose fiduciary misconduct, the effect of treating the fiduci-
ary as the client is to force the attorney to abandon the representation to
avoid being accused of participation or complicity in the fiduciary's
wrongdoing.4" Withdrawal does not serve the interests of the benefi-
ciaries who rightly are regarded as the real parties in interest, it does not
rectify the wrongdoing, and it leaves the attorney with the very difficult
advice of counsel with respect to matters affecting the administration of the
estate ....
Accordingly, the court finds that the memorandum is not a document pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege as between the fiduciaries and benefi-
ciaries of the estate. Therefore, disclosure of the memorandum to ... the spouse
did not waive the attorney-client privilege as to other documents protected by
the privilege.
Iad at 473-74. Estate of Torian v. Smith, 564 S.W.2d 521 (Ark. 1978), held that there is
no privilege as against the beneficiaries because the attorney represents the beneficiaries,
which reflects the second rationale for the Baker conclusion. If the second rationale for
disclosure is not applicable, however, because the beneficiaries are not properly regarded
as the attorney's clients in the garden variety fiduciary representation situation, then the
first rationale would support the court's holding alone, and that is the logic underlying
the ABA Study Committee Report conclusions. Under this analysis, Baker would be
authority for the proposition that the ABA Study Committee proposal will not result in a
waiver or loss of the attorney-client privilege if information is revealed to the benefi-
ciaries.
Dicta in Robertson v. Central Jersey Bank & Trust Co., 834 F. Supp. 705, 710 (D.NJ.
1993) (guardian ad litem's report prepared for appointing court was not protected by
attorney-client privilege because guardian, who was a lawyer, was not acting in a legal
capacity and because there could be no expectation of confidentiality because the report
was prepared for disclosure to the court), supports the notion that disclosure to a court
destroys the attorney-client privilege if the court record is a public document; quaere
whether an attorney's discretionary disclosure to a court can be made under such circum-
stances that any otherwise existing privilege is not destroyed.
47. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Dec. C-778
(1964) (attorney for guardian did not represent the ward and could not reveal guardian's
misappropriation of funds).
48. See Hazard, Client Fraud, supra note 29.
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line to draw of when withdrawal is required. The final advantage of the
entity representation alternative, then, is that it need not create this con-
flict of interest anguish.
Illustration and Comparison of the
ABA Study Committee Report and
the Entity Representation Alternative
In cases that involve a breach by the fiduciary, any resolution of the
issue that favors the fiduciary with confidentiality and loyalty protects
the party least entitled to protection. Under a resolution that regards the
fiduciary as the client and the duty of confidentiality as applicable, the
attorney either must be able to reveal information or to signal knowl-
edgeable beneficiaries that something is wrong by the manner in which a
withdrawal is accomplished. Without the latitude provided by any of the
three exceptions to the duty of confidentiality or by the entity representa-
tion alternative, an attorney who does right by the beneficiaries by violat-
ing the fiduciary's expectations and rights as a client may be civilly liable
to the fiduciary and may have destroyed the attorney-client privilege as
against discovery by outsiders. 9
Without a rule allowing disclosure, the attorney's only allowable re-
course is the mere act of withdrawal, which may not put the parties most
entitled to protection on notice that they should seek representation of
their own to investigate something that is amiss. Thus, if traditional
thinking regards the fiduciary as the attorney's client, and if the duty of
confidentiality applies because no exception is triggered, then the attor-
ney cannot disclose information that reveals the wrongdoing: only the
manner of withdrawal may constitute a warning that there is a prob-
lem.5 ° With certain fiduciary situations, particularly involving the eld-
erly, this constitutes a very significant deficiency in the manner in which
the rules of professional responsibility apply to fiduciary representations.
In the context of the hypothetical, when A learns of fiduciary invest-
ments that A regards as improper, or learns that one cofiduciary has
engaged in prohibited self dealing, a traditional application of the duty of
confidentiality would require A to determine whether any exception to
the Model Rule 1.6 duty of confidentiality exists. If none does, then A
would need to decide whether to withdraw, and whether or how to do so
in a manner that alerts a court or other beneficiaries or cofiduciaries of
the existence of a problem without violating the duty of confidentiality to
the fiduciary. Announcing to a supervisory court that A is withdrawing
but cannot say why, while encouraging the court to order an accounting
or inventory, is an odd manner to preserve confidences while revealing
enough information about the problem to alert other parties and argua-
49. See supra note 46.
50. See Hazard, Client Fraud, supra note 29, at 304. Hazard characterizes the situa-
tion thusly: "What the ABA has done [in Rule 1.6] is loudly to proclaim that a lawyer
may not blow the whistle, but quietly to affirm that [the lawyer] may wave a flag."
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bly protect their interests (and perhaps to protect the attorney from vio-
lating any duty to the beneficiaries that could result in their suing the
attorney).
Both the ABA Study Committee Report and the entity representation
approaches obviate the need to engage in such a ritual, in each case per-
mitting the attorney to exercise discretion whether to reveal information
to a beneficiary or any supervisory court. The difference between these
two alternatives is that the entity representation approach allows disclo-
sure without creating a rule that is contrary to traditional thinking about
the duty of confidentiality, without concerns over violation of duties of
loyalty to the attorney's client (which is the fiduciary under the ABA
Study Committee resolution), and without risk of greater damage to the
attorney-client privilege."1 The entity approach does not expose entity
confidences to outsider discovery, it does not require the attorney to fear
retaliation by the fiduciary who might feel entitled to the attorney's undi-
vided loyalty, and it does not require the attorney to rely on any of the
three stated exceptions to Model Rule 1.6.52
The ABA Study Committee Report avoids these issues by sublimating
the duty of confidentiality. Experience shows that regarding the fiduci-
ary as the client is easier for some to conceptualize and acknowledge
than trying to overcome traditional notions that a fiduciary entity does
not have a legal existence, even for the limited purposes of Model Rule
1.13. The entity representation resolution avoids the confidentiality is-
sues because disclosure among constituents of the entity is appropriate
and proper. The charade of preserving confidences while waving the
withdrawal flag is eliminated under either alternative because the attor-
ney is permitted to directly notify beneficiaries or a supervisory court
that a problem exists. But to accomplish this desirable objective, the
ABA Study Committee Report must alter the meaning of Model Rule
1.6 while the entity representation alternative interprets the rules in a
manner that makes disclosure permissible without affecting the applica-
tion or operation of Model Rule 1.6.
The Intermediary Alternative
Although not noted by the Model Rules or existing authority, it might
be argued that Model Rule 2.2 is a theoretically correct provision to deal
with the fiduciary representation situation. The theory would be that the
attorney, along with the fiduciary, serves as a mediator between benefi-
ciaries and other claimants (such as creditors) of the fiduciary entity.
The root of such an analysis is the notion that the fiduciary is charged
with the responsibility of impartially representing the best interests of all
parties who are interested in the fiduciary entity and the attorney merely
51. See supra note 46.
52. Only the attorney defense exception appears applicable in this situation, and that
only if the "affirmative" defense argument actually has merit. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 31.
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assists the fiduciary in fulfilling that duty. Under this intermediary ap-
proach, the attorney would be free to reveal information obtained from
one party to the intermediation (such as the income beneficiary) to any
other party (such as a remainder beneficiary), to the extent it is relevant
to the representation.53 It is questionable, however, whether disclosure
to a supervisory court or instigation of court proceedings to redress a
fiduciary defalcation would be authorized under this alternative. Be-
cause the fiduciary and the attorney both are in the role of intermediator
and not as parties to the intermediation, it is not clear that secrets of one
intermediator (the fiduciary) may be revealed to anyone. Alternatively, if
this theory of a joint intermediation is accurate, it might be argued that
the attorney has no client as such (and surely not the fiduciary, which is
just a joint intermediator), so nothing is protected from disclosure within
the intermediation.54
Other problems exists with the intermediation notion. For example,
Model Rule 2.2(c) permits any client of a mediation to discharge the
attorney, presumably meaning that any beneficiary or potentially even a
creditor could require the attorney to withdraw. Beneficiaries and other
claimants normally do not have a right to dismiss the fiduciary, much
less the fiduciary's counsel.55 Further, there is no indication in Model
Rule 2.2 or its Comments that this Rule was intended to cover more in a
fiduciary setting than, potentially, mediation of a conflict between multi-
ple fiduciaries or conflicting beneficiaries. Thus, this interpretation does
not appear to provide a workable rule that fiduciary secrets may be dis-
closed to any interested party.
The Beneficiary as Client Alternative
Although it may seem that the real parties in interest in a fiduciary
representation are the beneficiaries, and therefore that the beneficiaries
ought to be regarded as the client, this view finds little direct support in
the authorities and confuses the client identity issue with the question of
an attorney's liability to a nonclient (a beneficiary) flowing from acts of
the attorney. For example, several courts have held that "an attorney
[who] represents a [fiduciary] ... assumes a duty of care and fiduciary
duties toward the beneficiaries,"56 notwithstanding that in some cases the
beneficiary was separately represented. This is not to say, however, that
the beneficiaries were clients of the attorney. The proposed Restatement
of the Law Governing Lawyers § 73(4)57 formulation is that
53. See Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule 2.2 cmt.
54. See id., recognizing that confidentiality does not bar disclosures within the com-
mon representation.
55. See 2 Scott on Trusts, supra note 24, § 107.3.
56. Fickett v. Superior Court, 558 P.2d 988 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); Charleson v. Har-
desty, 839 P.2d 1303, 1306-07 (Nev. 1992), citing Schick v. Bach, 238 Cal. Rptr. 902, 908
(1987).
57. (Council Draft No. 10, Nov. 17, 1993).
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a lawyer owes a duty... to a non-client when and to the extent that
circumstances... make it clear that appropriate action by the lawyer
is necessary ... (b) to prevent or rectify a crime or fraud violating a
fiduciary duty owed by a client to a non-client, when the non-client is
not reasonably able to protect its rights and recognizing such a duty
would not create inconsistent duties significantly impairing the per-
formance of the lawyer's obligations to the client.
Comment h to § 73 further provides that:
[A] lawyer must use due care to protect a beneficiary when it is clear
that this is necessary to prevent a criminal or fraudulent violation of
fiduciary duties . . . or to rectify (typically by disclosure) the conse-
quences of such a violation, and when action by the lawyer would not
violate the jurisdiction's professional rules. The duty is essential be-
cause of the importance of fiduciary duties and the need of their benefi-
ciaries for protection. Because fiduciaries are generally obliged to
pursue the interests of their beneficiaries, recognizing the duty will not
ordinarily subject the lawyer to conflicting or inconsistent duties.
Moreover, to the extent that the lawyer has assisted, even unwittingly,
in creating a risk of injury, it is appropriate to impose a preventive and
corrective duty on the lawyer....
The duty recognized by Subsection (4)(b) arises only when circum-
stances known to the lawyer make it clear that appropriate action by
the lawyer is necessary to prevent or rectify a crime or fraud violating
a fiduciary duty owed by a client. The duty thus exists only when
circumstances known to the lawyer make it clear that a crime or fraud
has occurred or is about to occur....
Subsection (4)(b) recognizes a lawyer's duty only when the benefici-
ary of fiduciary duties is not reasonably able to protect himself or her-
self. That would be the case, for example, where the beneficiary is
incompetent and not represented by counsel or protected by a guardian
other than the lawyer's client. It would also be the case where the
fiduciary had kept from the beneficiary the information needed to put
the beneficiary on notice of a breach....
A lawyer owing a duty under Subsection (4)(b) is not liable for fail-
ing to take an act forbidden by professional rules to which the lawyer
is subject .... Thus, a lawyer is not liable for failing to disclose confi-
dences when the jurisdiction's rules forbid the disclosure.... For ex-
ample, if a fiduciary retains a lawyer to advise and defend the fiduciary
in dealing with the consequences of a crime or fraud that the fiduciary
has already committed, the lawyer is not liable for failing to inform the
beneficiary of the breach.
As applied in this context, this means that the fiduciary has duties to the
beneficiaries that may create a duty on the fiduciary's attorney in certain
cases, but the beneficiaries do not become the attorney's clients. Exam-
ple 8 to § 73 illustrates the operation of this formulation:
Lawyer represents Client in Client's capacity as trustee of an express
trust for the benefit of Beneficiary. Client tells Lawyer that Client pro-
poses to transfer trust funds into Client's own account, in circum-
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stances in which this would constitute the crime of embezzlement.
Lawyer informs Client that the transfer would be criminal, but Client
nevertheless makes the transfer, as Lawyer then knows. Lawyer takes
no further steps to prevent Client's unlawful act or to rectify its conse-
quences, for example by warning Beneficiary or informing the court to
which Client as trustee must make an annual accounting. The jurisdic-
tion's professional rules do not forbid such disclosures.... Client be-
comes insolvent and the funds are lost, to the harm of Beneficiary.
Lawyer is subject to liability to Beneficiary under this Section.
This derivative or indirect liability to the beneficiaries as nonclients raises
several problems.
One is the duty of confidentiality, which the Restatement rule deals
away by predicating disclosure on there being no violation of the duty,
which makes the rest of the disclosure duty irrelevant: if it were no viola-
tion of the duty, it would be an easy matter to regard the fiduciary as the
client and not agonize over the ability to protect the beneficiaries. Thus,
the Restatement's caveat is instead an effective negation.
Another problem is cost, especially if the case involves a court ap-
pointed fiduciary that must account to the court, because attorney in-
volvement of the variety anticipated may duplicate fiduciary functions
and oversight that should be performed by a supervisory court, all at an
increased cost to the entity and, ultimately, to its beneficiaries. Comment
h to Restatement § 73 states that the attorney's duty exists "only when
circumstances known to the lawyer make it clear that appropriate ac-
tion" is required, which may be an effort to minimize the need to make
affirmative inquiries or exercise oversight to avoid liability. It is unlikely
that this will provide enough comfort or guidance to relieve the attorney
from the perceived need to be proactive, however, which leaves the risk
of increasing costs.
To the extent this rule thereby turns a fiduciary's attorney into a fidu-
ciary watchdog, it also subverts the attorney's representation of the fidu-
ciary. A fiduciary that desires counsel in a classic sense, with duties of
loyalty and confidentiality to the fiduciary alone, therefore might be
forced to hire yet another attorney as the fiduciary's individual counsel
and, at least indirectly, pass that cost along to the beneficiaries as well.
Finally, not only is the attorney conflicted, with no clear indication
whether the duty of confidentiality exists and therefore constitutes an
impediment, the attorney may not even know the identity of the benefi-
ciaries and, if the fiduciary is not court appointed, the ability to fulfill the
stated duty is made extremely difficult, if not impossible. Although this
last impediment can infect any of the other resolutions offered, they do
not involve an affirmative duty to unknown beneficiaries that can expose
the attorney to liability with no reasonable opportunity to fulfill the at-
torney's obligations.
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Criticisms of the Entity Representation Alternative
Another American Bar Association report ("the Link Report") 58 ac-
knowledges that "traditionally, and in most situations," the attorney
hired to assist in the administration of an estate has been regarded as
owing its duties to the personal representative. That Report discusses
several perceived impediments to finding the fiduciary entity to be the
client.
First, the Link Report states that "[t]he constituents of an estate...
are not as structured as a corporate hierarchy. The language of [Model
Rule 1.13] and comment, therefore, does not support an interpretation of
the estate as an entity." 59 It also cites Restatement of the Law Gov-
erning Lawyers § 212 Comment b, which refers to the fact that
"[p]ersons forming an organization ... usually are linked by a common
interest that partly transcends their individual interests," and states that
this
suggests that an estate is not an "organization" subject to the applica-
tion of § 212. The individual beneficiaries of an estate maintain their
own interests; if anything, their individual interests transcend the com-
mon interest. The Restatement comments support the inference that
an estate is not an "entity," as defined by the Model Rules.60
As illustrated in the hypothetical, it is clear and perhaps likely that indi-
vidual beneficiaries and even separate cofiduciaries may have conflicting
interests and objectives. It is questionable, however, whether benefi-
ciaries of a fiduciary entity place their common interests above those of
the entity or of each other vis-a-vis the rest of the world, any more than
the shareholders of a corporation or the partners in a partnership place
their individual interests above those of the organization when dealing
with anyone other than other constituents of the entity. It is not uncom-
mon for constituents of any entity to place their individual interests
above those of other constituents when dealing with each other, but the
fiduciary entity does not differ with respect to the way its constituents
regard themselves in dealing with outsiders, including agents of the en-
tity such as the entity's attorney. Nor do the attorney's role or duties
differ as compared to the representation of a more commonly regarded
organizational client. In addition, nothing in the Model Rule or Restate-
ment indicates that any thought, positive or negative, was given to apply-
ing the entity representation alternative to a fiduciary entity.
The Link Report also suggests that the entity approach raises several
58. Ronald C. Link, Significant New Developments in Probate and Trust Law Practice.
Developments Regarding the Professional Responsibility of the Estate Administration Law-
yer: The Effect of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 26 Real Prop., Prob. & Trust
J. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Link Report] (produced by the Committee on Significant New
Developments in Probate and Trust Law Practice of the Probate and Trust Division of
the Real Property, Probate and Trust Section of the American Bar Association).
59. Id. at 67 n.142.
60. Id
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additional problems. One is that the attorney may be a beneficiary of the
estate, so a decision in the best interests of the entity may benefit the
attorney personally. To this might be added the fact that the attorney
may be the fiduciary. According to the Report, "suspicious beneficiaries,
who may infer that the attorney acted only in his interests, would have to
speak through the personal representative and either (1) require an expla-
nation or (2) obtain their own attorney to investigate the situation."'"
This commentary ignores the fact that attorneys always have the risk of
conflicting independent interests, as to which the ethics rules provide gui-
dance and relief.62 This situation is similar to that in which an attorney
represents a corporation in which the attorney is a shareholder, officer,
director, or any combination of these.
A second problem noted is that:
Problems with a duty of confidentiality may arise when the personal
representative, as agent of the entity, gives the attorney information
concerning a conflict. Such information must be made available to the
entity if it is in the entity's best interest. Nevertheless, dissemination of
confidential information within the entity is proper only to the extent
the entity client has authorized disclosure.63
This statement misperceives the rules relating to confidentiality and dis-
closure within an entity representation. "Information given to the law-
yer by agents of the entity must be made available to the entity when it is
in the best interest of the entity."'6 According to the Comment to Model
Rule 1.13, "[t]he lawyer may not disclose ... information relating to the
representation except for disclosures explicitly or impliedly authorized
by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation,"
which includes disclosures to constituents (beneficiaries or a supervisory
court in the context of a fiduciary entity) if necessary to rectify wrongdo-
ing."5 That the wrongdoing fiduciary as an agent of the entity would not
authorize such disclosure is not the appropriate test, any more than a
corporate officer's objection would preclude corporate counsel from dis-
closing the officer's misconduct. There is no privilege vis-a-vis constitu-
ents of an entity,66 nor is there a duty of confidentiality if disclosure is in
the best interests of the entity.
A third point made by the Link Report is that:
A duty of loyalty to the group requires the lawyer to assess indepen-
dently what is best for the group as a whole, because the attorney,
beneficiaries, and personal representative are co-agents of the estate.
67
61. Id. at 68 n.143.
62. See Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule 1.8.
63. Link Report, supra note 58, at 68 n.143, citing Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule
1.6(a).
64. Hazard & Hodes, supra note 19, § 1.13:107, at 396.
65. Model Rules, supra note 3, Rule 1.13 cmt.
66. See supra note 21.
67. Quaere whether it is copacetic to refer to beneficiaries as agents of a fiduciary
entity.
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If the personal representative acts adversely to the estate's interest, the
attorney should, as the comment suggests, recommend that the per-
sonal representative obtain independent representation. The attorney
does not violate Rule 1.9 by litigating on behalf of the "estate" client
against the personal representative, because the representative does not
qualify as a "former client." The estate normally acts through the per-
sonal representative, however, creating a very difficult conflict situa-
tion. The language of the Rule and comment, as well as the many
potential problems, suggest that an estate is not an entity client within
the meaning of Rule 1.13.68
The existence of such a conflict of interest is no different, or more severe,
than the conflicts that may arise between an attorney for a corporation or
other organization and its officers, agents, or constituents with whom the
attorney previously has dealt. In each case Model Rule 1.13(e) recog-
nizes that representation of the constituent personally may entail a con-
flict of interest, and Model Rule 1.13(d) stresses that the attorney must
"explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organiza-
tion's interests are adverse to those of the constituents with whom the
lawyer is dealing." This potential adversity is no justification for re-
jecting the entity-representation concept when dealing with an estate or
trust, any more than it is in dealing with any other organization.
Notwithstanding these asserted problems, the Link Report itself makes
it clear why the entity representation approach would be useful. The
following statements all are intended by that Report to inform its reader
of the parameters of the rule that applies in this situation. First, regard-
ing the need to define the client in the context of fiduciary dishonesty, the
Link Report notes the duty of confidentiality but concedes that:
[T]he duty of disclosure may rise above the duty to maintain
confidentiality.
It is the duty of the attorney to observe the proper purpose of the
representation. For instance, if the fiduciary requests the attorney's
advice on how to rectify or cover-up illegal actions, the attorney must
act carefully to avoid implication in the misconduct. Under Rule
1.2(d), the attorney has a duty not to assist a fiduciary in perpetuating
a fraud. Furthermore, the attorney's duty of loyalty runs to the fiduci-
ary as a primary client but may also extend to protection of the benefi-
ciaries' interests as the secondary clients.
69
Citing Hazard for the primary-secondary aspect but no authority for the
duty to protect against dishonesty by the fiduciary, the Report accepts
that this is most problematic if the fiduciary is regarded as the client.
Then it says:
[In the] primary-derivative client matter, the attorney also owes a duty
of loyalty to the beneficiary, and the attorney must, consequently, try
to remove the fiduciary. If the attorney is characterized as an interme-
68. Link Report, supra note 58, at 68 n.143 (footnote added).
69. Id at 75-76 (citation omitted).
1994] 1347
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
diary between multiple clients, disclosure of the information is not con-
sidered a breach of his duty to the fiduciary. The attorney is protected
by his warning to the fiduciary at the outset of representation. The
Rules acknowledge that joint representation alters the rules of confi-
dentiality and, consequently, the attorney-client privilege. Under these
circumstances, the fiduciary has no recourse against the attorney who
discloses information, because the duty of confidentiality provides for
effective representation of both the fiduciary and beneficiary.70
Disclosure is consistent with both the entity representation concept and
with the ABA Study Committee Report, neither of which rely upon
either a joint representation or an intermediation model (much less
both). The Link Report also states that:
In representing a dishonest fiduciary, the attorney not only must main-
tain loyalty to the beneficiaries but also must be truthful to the probate
court regarding the fiduciary's actions. If pertinent information is not
disclosed on the inventory or death tax returns, and if the attorney
discovers this or is informed by the personal representative, the attor-
ney is caught between a duty of confidentiality to the fiduciary and a
duty of disclosure to the government or beneficiaries. The correct re-
sponse of the attorney is usually disclosure when the fiduciary's action
is fraudulent or criminal. This response is supported by Rule 1.2
"Scope of Representation" and Rule 3.3 "Candor Toward the
Tribunal."
7 1
To the extent this is correct, it is consistent with both the entity approach
and the ABA Study Committee Report, but neither Model Rule 1.2(d)
(cited) nor Model Rule 4.1 (not cited) is implicated if the attorney did
not assist the fiduciary and, because the government is not a tribunal,
Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) is not applicable; furthermore, the attorney does
not have a duty of disclosure to the government.72 More importantly,
any duty of loyalty to beneficiaries should not be limited to circum-
stances in which a tribunal is involved and Model Rule 3.3 is implicated,
and in all cases the attorney's duty should be limited to circumstances in
which the attorney assists the fiduciary.
Finally, the Link Report states that:
If the attorney fails to persuade the client to allow disclosure, the com-
ment outlines the possible remedial measures the attorney must make
70. Id. at 77 (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 78.
72. Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.21 (1993) (the government's own rules regulating
practice before it in the tax arena). Section 10.21 specifies that "[e]ach attorney ... who
.. knows that the client has not complied with the revenue laws ... or has made an
error in or omission from any return.., shall advise the client promptly of the fact ...."
But although the attorney is required to advise the client to amend an erroneous return or
to file a missing return, Circular 230 does not require Attorney to blow the whistle on the
client. Moreover, the better position regarding Model Rule 3.3 is that the IRS is not in
the position of a tribunal in this respect. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965). Thus, disclosure notwithstanding the rule of con-
fidentiality is not required.
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to comply with Rule 3.3(a)(4). The attorney must first remonstrate the
client confidentially, then seek to withdraw, and finally, if these meas-
ures fail, make disclosure to the court. 3
Further, the Link Report suggests that the failure to disclose to the court
constitutes a fraud on a tribunal under Model Rule 3.3 because the attor-
ney is an officer of the court.
This analysis results in the Link Report's conclusion that disclosure is
required. But it reaches this result in an uncertain manner informed only
by Model Rule 3.3, which is not applicable in an unsupervised adminis-
tration because there is no tribunal, and it requires the attorney to ascer-
tain when duties to beneficiaries of a derivative or secondary nature or
duties to a tribunal outweigh duties of a primary nature to the fiduciary.
The ABA Study Committee Report suffers the same need to exercise dis-
cretion and balance conflicting duties.
On the other hand, the entity representation alternative absolves the
attorney from having to determine whether activities about which the
entity and its constituents should know rise to the level of "a criminal or
fraudulent act" that then permit or require disclosure under Model Rule
3.3(a)(2), whether the attorney assisted in the fiduciary's crime or fraud
in a way that triggers Model Rule 4.1, or whether the duty of confidenti-
ality exception to that Rule removes the duty or ability to disclose. The
entity as client alternative under the dictates of Model Rule 1.13 reaches
the right protective conclusions in a simple and untormented manner be-
cause the wrongdoer is not entitled to protection as against the constitu-
ents with the primary interest. It is both logical and helpful to interpret
these rules to regard the fiduciary entity as the client, the court and the
beneficiaries as entitled to disclosure, and the fiduciary as an agent (like
the officers of a corporation) who, when doing wrong, is entitled to no
protection vis-a-vis constituents of the entity. Such an analysis produces
more certain and less anguished action by the attorney in pursuing a
result---disclosure--that every alternative embraces.
Although the duty of confidentiality is the most difficult aspect of the
client identity issue, there also is the issue of attorney liability to the
beneficiaries. This is not a very difficult question if a negligent attorney
can be sued by the fiduciary under an analysis that regards the fiduciary
as the attorney's client and also recognizes that the beneficiaries could
force the fiduciary to sue the attorney. Thus, even if the beneficiaries are
not the attorney's clients and even if there is a privity defense or a lack of
derivative duties to the beneficiaries, it would be unusual for attorney
malpractice exposure to be avoidable under either alternative. As a con-
sequence, it makes little sense to argue over a rule that, at best, makes it
more cumbersome for the real parties in interest to redress an attorney's
wrongs. There is, however, yet another issue that deserves more detailed
consideration.
73. Link Report, supra note 58, at 81.
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The Link Report cites Model Rule 1.9 as prohibiting an attorney who
has withdrawn from a fiduciary representation from thereafter represent-
ing the beneficiaries, the entity itself, or a new fiduciary against the for-
mer fiduciary to recover any losses attributable to the former fiduciary's
misconduct. The Report suggests that "[r]epresentation in opposition to
the personal representative in the administration of the estate would
clearly be regarded as changing sides" in violation of Model Rule 1.9.74
"The lawyer is also prohibited from using information relating to the
representation of a former client to the disadvantage of the client .... ."'
Presumably the effect of this interpretation is that, if fiduciary miscon-
duct is discovered, the attorney must withdraw (if the representative
won't make it right when admonished to do so) and may not participate
in an action to redress that wrongdoing, notwithstanding the attorney's
special knowledge and abilities in this endeavor.
Such a proscription would be wasteful and contrary to the expecta-
tions of all but the defalcating fiduciary. Both the Link Report and the
ABA Study Committee Report reach resolutions that suffer the same de-
fect by virtue of regarding the client as the fiduciary rather than the en-
tity. Unlike both of these reports, however, if the entity is viewed as the
client to whom the attorney always owes the exclusive duty of loyalty
and any agent betrays this client, the attorney is not changing sides when
actions are undertaken to rectify the wrongdoing. Under the entity ap-
proach the fiduciary is only an agent acting on behalf of the entity as true
client and no rule prohibits the attorney from representing the entity in
redressing such wrongdoing. This approach is workable to the extent the
fiduciary and all other constituents is advised at the beginning of the rep-
resentation (as admonished in Model Rule 1.13(d)) that the attorney rep-
resents the entity and not the individual agents or constituents thereof.
LIMITATIONS ON THE ENTITY REPRESENTATION ALTERNATIVE
Regardless of how the question of the client's identity is resolved, it is
clear that it is improper for an attorney to represent a fiduciary entity as
well as the fiduciary or the beneficiaries of the entity individually, if their
interests conflict, unless the consent required in Model Rule 1.7 is se-
cured.7 6 Fortunately, not all beneficiaries and entities present conflicts of
interest, but conflicts are not unlikely, as shown by the hypothetical.77
74. Id. at 90.
75. Id. at 91.
76. See, e.g., In re Estate of Ragan, 786 P.2d 754 (Ore. Ct. App. 1990), af'd, 843 P.2d
442 (Ore. 1992) (potential conflict arose when estate's attorney discovered that adminis-
tration expenses, including attorney fees, would consume the entire estate, which was
worth considerably less than originally valued, leaving nothing for beneficiary the attor-
ney also represented). Securing consent could be complicated because it is not clear who
may give that consent on behalf of a fiduciary entity, particularly if the conflict involves
the fiduciary as an individual. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibil-
ity, Informal Op. 564 (1962); supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
77. Conflict should be expected in most sophisticated situations, given tax related
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Thus, any attempted mutual representation is fraught with conflict of
interest danger. Similarly, it would be improper for a drafting attorney
to represent beneficiaries or disfranchised heirs seeking to set aside a de-
cedent's will.7
None of these situations diminishes the propriety, however, of regard-
ing the entity as the client in the normal fiduciary relation, nor are any
constituents precluded from engaging the services of other attorneys to
represent their personal interests. This particularly is true about a
wrongdoing fiduciary who wishes to hire an attorney and compensate
that attorney out of its own resources, guaranteeing the attorney's confi-
dentiality and loyalty and avoiding any conflicts with the entity and its
attorney.
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE ENTITY REPRESENTATION ALTERNATIVE
Example: Attorney represented Decedent (D) and drafted D's estate
plan, which named D's child (C) as executor of D's estate and as
trustee of several following trusts that will be held for the primary ben-
efit of D's surviving spouse for life, remainder to D's descendants.
During the course of administration Attorney discovers that C has
made several decisions that work to the benefit of the remainder benefi-
ciaries of the trusts, including C, and to the detriment of the surviving
spouse. Attorney has advised C that these decisions were improper
and has recommended corrective action but C has not followed Attor-
ney's advice. Rather than merely withdraw from this representation,
decisions that must be made (for example, elections such as partial QTIP, alternate valua-
tion, generation-skipping transfer tax reverse QTIP and exemption allocation, trapping
distribution, section 642(g) swing item, section 643(e) DNI carry-out, and section 643(g)
estimated tax allocation), the possibility of statutory forced heir share elections, will con-
tests, disclaimers, contested accountings, valuations, funding, investment decisions, and
principal and income allocations in administration of an entity that may disfranchise one
or more beneficiaries, and the resultant need to make equitable adjustments to compen-
sate for the effects of those decisions and, potentially, giving rise to a surcharge action
against the fiduciary. See generally Malcolm A. Moore, Conflicting Interests in Post-
mortem Planning, 9 U. Miami Inst. Est. Plan. 1900 (1975); Malcolm A. Moore, Con-
flicts in Post-Mortem Planning After the Tax Reform Act, 12 U. Miami Inst. Est. Plan f
600 (1978).
78. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 564
(1962) (which also held that it was improper to represent the decedent's corporation and
the decedent's estate when a dispute over the corporate stock arose during probate); In re
Estate of Bartoli, 533 N.Y.S.2d 324 (App. Div. 1988), aff'g Will of Bartoli, 521 N.Y.S.2d
392 (Surr. 1987) (drafting attorney could not represent contestants); In re Estes, 221
N.W.2d 322 (Mich. 1974) (attorney suspended for representing co-executor in suit
against estate as to which attorney was the other co-executor). Cf Goldthwaite v. Disci-
plinary Bd. of the Alabama State Bar, 408 So.2d 504 (Ala. 1982) (ethics violation of
having represented personal representative and then contestants avoided in part because
attorney was one of the heir-contestants); In re Williams, 309 N.E.2d 579 (Il1. 1974)
(attorney censured for representing surviving ex-spouse in collecting insurance proceeds
after having represented the decedent in having the ex-spouse removed as beneficiary
under those policies); In re Michal, 112 N.E.2d 603 (11. 1953) (it was improper for attor-
ney to represent surviving spouse attempting to defeat prenuptial agreement the attorney
drafted for the decedent).
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Attorney reminds C that Attorney represents the estate and the follow-
ing trusts and not C personally and, in that capacity, may disclose
information relating to these decisions and their effects to the surviving
spouse, notwithstanding C's objections that Attorney is precluded by
the attorney-client privilege and the duties of loyalty and confidential-
ity. Faced with this disclosure, C either will make the corrections rec-
ommended by Attorney or will hire counsel to represent C or all the
remainder beneficiaries in arguing that the actions taken were proper.
The surviving spouse also may need to hire counsel and, lacking a
Model Rule 1.7 consent, Attorney should not also represent any
beneficiary.
Example: Attorney represented the personal representative (E) of the
estate of a decedent whom Attorney never met. Although E is not a
beneficiary of the estate, E was named as joint tenant with right of
survivorship on a substantial certificate of deposit with the decedent
and claims that it passed to E at the decedent's death as nonprobate
property. E asks Attorney to determine whether the certificate of de-
posit properly is an asset of the estate. Attorney may render that opin-
ion because Attorney's client is not E personally but the estate and all
its constituents. Attorney may disclose to the other beneficiaries that
the certificate of deposit exists and should inform them that, if they are
not satisfied with Attorney's opinion regarding E's survivorship rights,
they may retain their own counsel.79
Hypothetical: A learned of fiduciary decisions made by the cotrustees
who are remainder beneficiaries of the trust, indicating that self-deal-
ing and conflicts of interest have infected administration of the trust.
As income beneficiary and a cotrustee, S is the person A normally
would inform about these actions and it would be up to S to proceed to
enforce corrective action. Because S may be unable to process this
information when disclosed by A, an alternative course of action may
be necessary. As attorney for the entity, A has no obligation to obtain
representation for S because S individually is not A's client, but A may
be permitted to institute proceedings for the appointment of a personal
representative for S80 and, if such a representative is appointed to pro-
tect the interests of S, disclosure by A to that representative also would
be permitted. Alternatively, having advised the cotrustees to rectify
their improprieties and given their refusal, A need not withdraw but
instead may report the fiduciary breaches to an appropriate court if it
is clear that the remainder beneficiaries are not interested in challeng-
ing these actions and that S is not in a position to pursue a remedy.
79. See In re Estate of Roark, 829 S.W.2d 688 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (attorney's
dismissal by lower court and denial of fees and expenses reversed; opinion that personal
representative owned the certificate of deposit, which was not disclosed until a sensitive
sale of estate property was completed, nevertheless was regarded as timely because benefi-
ciaries' interests were not prejudiced by delay).
80. This topic is considered in other articles included in this symposium. See Burnele
Powell & Ronald C. Link, Confidentiality Issues in Representing the Elderly, 62 Fordham
L. Rev. 1197 (1994); Jan Ellen Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmful
Choices-What's an Attorney to Do Within and Beyond the Competency Construct?, 62
Fordham L. Rev. 1101 (1994).
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DEVIATIONS FROM THE ENTITY REPRESENTATION ALTERNATIVE
If the entity representation alternative is applicable as the default rule,
deviations from it would be permissible by agreement. Most likely a
deviation would be desired if the attorney never had a relationship to any
of the decedent or the beneficiaries, instead having been hired by the fidu-
ciary solely because of the attorney's prior contacts with the fiduciary.
In such a case the attorney might not want to be bound in any way to
beneficiaries to whom the attorney has no allegiance. Even then, how-
ever, as noted in Model Rule 1.13(e), because of likely expectations by
the beneficiaries, the attorney should make it clear that the fiduciary is
the sole client.8" This situation is not likely to arise unless the attorney is
hired after the fiduciary is in trouble, in which case it is even more appro-
priate that the client be regarded as solely the fiduciary.82
A second modification of the entity representation rule might be advo-
cated in cases involving representation of a guardian or conservator for
an incompetent ward. In such a case the ward is not self-sufficient and
cannot be expected to engage an attorney for separate representation or
to redress wrongs of the fiduciary that are revealed by the attorney. In-
deed, the very person charged with the duty to protect the ward is the
fiduciary who may be committing a wrong. Using cases from this unique
situation to establish a proposition that the attorney owes duties directly
to normal beneficiaries of fiduciary entities and extrapolating from this
special case to other fiduciary representation cases is ill-advised, because
the guardianship or conservatorship situation differs from the garden-
variety circumstance in which a beneficiary (or the beneficiary's personal
representative, if the beneficiary is incompetent) can be informed about a
default or breach and can be expected to then pursue remedies without
the assistance of the attorney for the entity.
Moreover, the guardianship or conservatorship situation may not itself
be an appropriate exception to the normal fiduciary representation rule.
Those who would impose duties on the attorney in a guardianship or
conservatorship directly for the benefit of the ward would answer that
there is no one else to serve that function. This ignores the fact that a
court is involved and, assuming the attorney does not assist in any fraud
on the tribunal, the court ought to protect the ward's interests if the
court is doing its job. Under the entity representation alternative the
attorney who is aware of a guardian's breach of duty is free to notify
either the ward (although this is not likely to be effective) or the court.
The only difference between this conclusion and the law that has been
81. Regarding the application of a reasonable expectations approach to determining
the identity of the client, see Note, An Expectations Approach to Client Identity, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 687 (1993).
82. In such a case it also might be appropriate for all attorney fees to be paid by the
fiduciary out of the fiduciary's own funds, subject to reimbursement from the entity if the
fiduciary is found to have acted properly.
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declared in a handful of cases83 is that the attorney would have no duty
to do so, which eliminates difficult questions that surround a "knew or
should have known" standard for imposing liability on the attorney and
therefore minimizes the risk of an attorney being sued for not discovering
a fiduciary defalcation that a reasonably competent or attentive attorney
would have recognized. A "should have known" standard with a duty to
disclose naturally would encourage attorneys to be more vigilant to avoid
such exposure, which could lead to the attorney becoming a fiduciary
watchdog and, in the process, duplicating the court's oversight function
and the fiduciary's administration, in both respects increasing costs.
As attorney for the guardianship or conservatorship rather than for
the guardian, conservator, or the ward, the attorney would have the dis-
cretion to act in the best interests of the guardianship or conservatorship,
which might include reporting the guardian or conservator's actions to
the beneficiary or might entail a report to an appropriate court, or both.
The difficult aspect of the guardianship or conservatorship case is
whether the attorney should be cast in the role of a superfiduciary,
charged with the responsibility to report fiduciary defalcations and im-
posed with liability for failing to do so. Under the entity representation
alternative it is unnecessary to adopt such an approach to give the attor-
ney the latitude to disclose fiduciary defalcations because the attorney
already has the authority to pursue actions that will make the situation
right. If courts do not regard this as an adequate result in this unique
situation, however, and therefore conclude that the ward also is a client
of the attorney, the need for this modification should be limited to this
special case and should not inform the proper resolution in garden vari-
ety entity representations.
CONCLUSION
Following the approach in Florida, other states should be encouraged
to establish, by express amendment to their Rules or by a Comment ex-
plaining them, who the attorney represents in the absence of a represen-
tation agreement to the contrary. In establishing this rule it is necessary
and appropriate to distinguish between an attorney's duties to nonclients
(such as beneficiaries under most of the alternative visions of the entity
representation situation) and to restrict the impetus to expand the con-
cept of "derivative" duties by adopting a rule that provides protection to
beneficiaries without creating untenable or undefinable obligations of the
attorney. Among the available options, regarding the beneficiaries as the
attorney's client should be rejected because the beneficiaries do not en-
gage the attorney, the beneficiaries almost always have conflicting inter-
ests (because some are current and others are future interest holders),
and in some cases the attorney may not know the wishes or even the
identity of the various beneficiaries. Casting the attorney in the role of a
83. See supra note 56.
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watchdog over the fiduciary to protect the interests of beneficiaries also is
untenable and subverts the attorney-client relation, regardless of who the
client is deemed to be. Any rule that creates an obligation on an attorney
to police a fiduciary should be rejected.
As regards the attorney's duties to the beneficiaries, an overview of the
wildly diverse statements in the case law84 shows that the attorney
should be bound by the same fiduciary duties that restrict the fiduciary's
dealings with the beneficiaries, such as the duties of impartiality, objec-
tivity, privacy, and loyalty (to avoid self dealing and conflicts of interest).
Regardless of the verbiage used, it seems reasonably predictable that the
same results would obtain in most cases under any of the formulations
advocated, in the sense that an attorney's action that violated a direct
attorney-client relation would be found to violate a derivative or fiduci-
ary duty to a nonclient beneficiary of the fiduciary or the fiduciary entity
that the attorney represents. Thus, it does not appear to matter much
how this question is resolved, except perhaps to the extent a privity re-
quirement effectively would preclude otherwise meritorious claims by
nonclient beneficiaries.
The intermediary alternative has no precedent and little to recommend
it, the confidentiality issue is not better resolved under it, and conflicts of
interest and the ability of any party to the intermediation to dismiss the
attorney under Model Rule 2.2(c) make it a worse result than the other
available resolutions. Thus, it too should be rejected.
As between the ABA Study Committee recommendation that the fidu-
ciary be regarded as the client, and the entity representation alternative,
a number of serious issues must be considered. The entity representation
approach has little direct precedential support. As against that detri-
ment, the ABA Study Committee approach presents a number of disad-
vantages, the most severe of which being that it depends upon a
confidentiality rule that also has no precedent. In addition, the need to
exercise discretion whether to reveal confidences places an attorney at
risk of liability to the fiduciary if the fiduciary is regarded as the client,
which is avoided under the entity representation approach because the
fiduciary is not the client and has no entitlement to confidentiality within
the entity (except to the extent a disclosure to constituents of the entity
was not necessary). Moreover, the ABA Study Committee alternative
presents the disadvantage that disclosure may constitute a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege for all purposes. Thus, it is easier for an attor-
ney to exercise the discretion to reveal information contrary to the wishes
of a fiduciary under the entity representation alternative, which facili-
tates the objective of protecting the integrity of fiduciary relations. Pre-
sumably this is the ultimate goal of any rule considered. Fortunately, on
the confidentiality issue alone, both approaches recognize and justify dis-
closure, making it seem clear that regardless of the theoretical underpin-
84. See supra text accompanying notes 3-23.
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nings employed, a defalcating fiduciary is not entitled to hide behind the
duty of confidentiality.
Aside from the duty of confidentiality, which is the most important
issue raised by the question of the identity of the attorney's client, other
elements of this analysis seem to favor an entity representation alterna-
tive. For example, regarding the fiduciary as the client opens the possi-
bility that a wrongdoing former fiduciary will dismiss the attorney, and
cofiduciaries who collectively are the client but who have conflicts be-
tween themselves cast the attorney into an unworkable position. In addi-
tion, if the attorney for a fiduciary finds it necessary or appropriate to
withdraw, Model Rule 1.9 would preclude the attorney from represent-
ing a successor fiduciary in an action that seeks to redress the fiduciary's
wrong; that problem is avoided if the attorney's client is regarded as the
entity itself. Because it is proper and desirable for the attorney to repre-
sent the entity in pursuing remedies against a wrongdoing fiduciary, a
rule that impedes the entity's recovery should be regarded with disfavor.
Because privity and the ability to redress attorney negligence are not
seriously impacted by any theory chosen, the balance seems to favor the
entity representation alternative. But regardless of the outcome on that
debate, the clear implication for every alternative discussed is that a
wrongdoing fiduciary is not entitled to confidentiality as a protection
against discovery and redress by the affected beneficiaries. Whether the
ABA Study Committee Report or the entity representation alternative is
adopted as the justification, the attorney should be free to protect the
beneficiaries' interests by disclosure. Either result is preferable to regard-
ing a wrongdoing fiduciary as a client that is entitled to confidentiality,
because that approach fails to notify any successor to the attorney of the
nature of the fiduciary's wrongdoing and it leaves withdrawal as the at-
torney's only permissible action, which poses significant risks to benefi-
ciaries who are too ignorant, naive, or oblivious to react to an attorney's
indirect signal sent solely by the manner of withdrawal. Both resolutions
justify notification of the beneficiaries or a court with jurisdiction, with-
out requiring the attorney to withdraw. And both negate the obligation
to abandon the beneficiaries by withdrawal at just the time when their
interests demand the greatest protection.
Because either alternative produces the right result, ultimately it is less
important which is favored so long as either is permissible and adopted.
In the final analysis, what this comparison also may prove is that the
original proposal to modify Model Rule 1.6 to permit disclosure of a
client's fraud or crimes that are likely to produce substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of a nonclient should be embraced by the
American Bar Association as it has been in varying forms in many
states. 5
85. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
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